Advanced Evolutionary Games Module
David K. Levine
link to class schedule
Hegemony, State Power and the Fall of Civilizations
Acemoglu and Robinson 
Why Nations Fail
Levine and Modica : Conflict and the Evolution of Societies
Calibrated Learning, No-regret, Universal Consistency and Convergence to Equilibrium
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine : "Learning with Recency Bias"
Foster, D. P. and P. Young : "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium,"
Basic Evolutionary Theory
Kandori, M., G. Mailath and R. Rob : “Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games,”
, 61: 27-56
Young, P. : “The Evolution of Conventions,”
, 61: 57-83
Morris, S., R. Rob and H. Shin : “p-dominance and Belief Potential,”
, 63: 145-158
Ellison, G. : “Basins of Attraction and Long Run Equilibria”
Advanced Theory of Evolution
Levine, D. K. and S. Modica : "Interim and Long-Run Dynamics in the Evolution of Conventions"
Problems for review
Problems for exam